Steering a Safe Course in Admiralty Removal Jurisdiction after the 2011 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Note by Modzelewski, Charles
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2015 
Steering a Safe Course in Admiralty Removal Jurisdiction after the 
2011 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Note 
Charles Modzelewski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Modzelewski, Charles, "Steering a Safe Course in Admiralty Removal Jurisdiction after the 2011 Federal 
Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Note" (2015). Connecticut Law Review. 289. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/289 
 1153 
CONNECTICUT 
LAW REVIEW 
 
VOLUME 47 MAY 2015 NUMBER 4 
 
Note 
STEERING A SAFE COURSE IN ADMIRALTY REMOVAL 
JURISDICTION AFTER THE 2011 FEDERAL COURTS 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT 
CHARLES MODZELEWSKI 
Federal jurisdiction over admiralty actions originates in the 
United States Constitution. Congress, in the admiralty jurisdiction 
statute, pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the saving to 
suitors clause, reserved to plaintiffs in admiralty actions the option 
of pursuing remedies in state court. However, in 2011, Congress 
enacted the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act 
(JVCA), which changed key language in the federal removal statute. 
The JVCA amendment has been interpreted by certain courts in a 
manner that has allowed removal of general maritime actions from 
state court to federal court, which is contrary to admiralty 
jurisprudence. Not only is the removal of general maritime actions 
contrary to precedent, but the removal of general maritime claims to 
federal courts would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause, an 
action that would fundamentally alter admiralty jurisdiction. As the 
saving to suitors clause would be eviscerated, interpreting the 2011 
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act to allow the 
removal of general maritime actions from state court to federal 
court is erroneous. 
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STEERING A SAFE COURSE IN ADMIRALTY REMOVAL 
JURISDICTION AFTER THE 2011 FEDERAL COURTS 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT 
CHARLES MODZELEWSKI 
“Maritime law is not a monistic system. The State and 
Federal Governments jointly exert regulatory powers today 
as they have played joint roles in the development of 
maritime law throughout our history.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Litigation is preferably avoided, but when litigation becomes 
inevitable, jurisdiction is one of the first and most important considerations 
when filing a lawsuit. Choosing between a state and federal forum has 
important ramifications for all parties involved, whether one is the plaintiff 
or the defendant. In certain circumstances the defendant may even play a 
role in choosing the litigation forum, through removing an action filed in 
state court to federal court. If jurisdictional law is unsettled or unclear, 
plaintiffs and defendants alike will be confused as to which fora are 
available, and whether they will be able to bring suit in the forum of their 
choice. A situation such as this can increase the cost of a lawsuit, by 
requiring motions and pleadings to simply establish the court in which the 
lawsuit will occur, while also decreasing judicial efficiency by requiring 
courts to attempt to clarify the jurisdictional law. Admiralty jurisdiction is 
currently facing such a situation due to the recent amendment to the federal 
removal statute. While jurisdiction is important in all lawsuits, jurisdiction 
is critically important in admiralty2 actions because it is determinative of 
special rights, remedies, and procedures available to the parties involved. 
This Note aims to navigate through the confusion regarding the recent 
amendment to the removal statute, and demonstrate how only one 
interpretation of the federal removal statute is correct.      
                                                                                                                          
 University of Connecticut, B.A. 2013, University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 
2016. I would like to thank the editors of the Connecticut Law Review for all their effort and hard work 
in editing my Note. I would also like to thank Professor Robert Birmingham for suggesting this Note 
topic to me and for offering his advice. Additionally, I would like to thank my family for supporting me 
in all my endeavors.  
1 Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 374 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.). 
2  For the purposes of this Note, I will use the term “admiralty” to refer to admiralty and maritime 
claims broadly unless specifically noted. 
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The United States Constitution provides that the federal courts will 
have jurisdiction over admiralty actions.3 Congress has enlarged this 
original grant of constitutional power by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1333.4 
Pursuant to the current language of this statute, Congress granted original 
jurisdiction to federal district courts of “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to 
which they are otherwise entitled.”5 The second half of this grant of power 
is commonly referred to as the saving to suitors clause or the savings 
clause.6  
The saving to suitors clause saves to a plaintiff whatever non-admiralty 
remedies he has available.7 The clause does not save a state remedy or a 
remedy in a state court, but saves to the plaintiff any common law remedy.8 
When a plaintiff seeks monetary damages in tort or contract actions that 
fall within admiralty, he usually has the choice of bringing suit in 
admiralty in federal court or bringing suit in state court.9 Thus, in practice, 
the saving to suitors clause allows a plaintiff certain control in determining 
in which forum to bring his suit. 
When a plaintiff brings a civil action in state court, the action may be 
removed to federal court by the defendant if specific statutory criteria are 
satisfied.10 However, in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,11 
the Supreme Court recognized an important exception to the removal of 
general maritime claims.12 In Romero, the Court noted that when a suit is 
commenced in state court, and it could have been brought in federal court 
on the basis of jurisdiction pursuant only to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the action 
may not be removed as it would undermine the purpose of the saving to 
                                                                                                                          
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (granting admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts). 
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction of “[a]ny 
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction”).  
5 Id. (emphasis added). 
6 See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 21 (2d ed. 1975) 
(“Consideration of the so-called ‘savings clause’ . . . must be deferred until a little later along . . . .”); 
see also ROBERT FORCE, FED. JUD. CTR., ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW 19 (2nd ed. 2013) (“Section 
1333 of title 28 not only confers admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts, it also contains a provision 
characterized as the ‘saving to suitors’ clause.”). 
7 GILMORE & BLACK, JR., supra note 6, at 37 (“[A] suitor who holds an in personam claim, which 
might be enforced by suit in personam in admiralty, may also bring suit, at his election, in the 
‘common law’ court—that is, by ordinary civil action in state court . . . .”); ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN 
NORRIS, LAW OF SEAMAN § 1.7 (5th ed. 2014). 
8 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866); FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.8. 
9 FORCE, supra note 6, at 19.    
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing the statutory criteria for the removal of actions). 
11 358 U.S. 354 (1959). 
12 See id. at 363, 370–73 (noting that general maritime claims are not removable solely on the 
basis of admiralty jurisdiction); FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11 (describing the Romero 
decision and the removability of general maritime claims). 
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suitors clause.13 Romero does not preclude the removal of all admiralty 
actions; it only precludes the removal of actions that are based solely on 28 
U.S.C. § 1333.14 Therefore, admiralty actions may be removed only when 
there is an independent basis for removal, such as when diversity of 
citizenship is present.15  
However, in 2011, Congress passed the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act (JVCA), which became effective in 2012.16 The 
JVCA, inter alia, changed the language of the federal removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441.17 The change of pertinent statutory language has led some 
courts and commentators to interpret the JVCA as relaxing the restriction 
on the removal of general maritime claims from state to federal court.18 
However, such an interpretation abrogates the saving to suitors clause by 
allowing a defendant to remove claims that have been properly brought by 
a plaintiff seeking common law remedies in state court. Thus, as this 
interpretation of the JVCA would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause 
and allow the removal of general maritime claims to federal court, this 
interpretation is erroneous.  
This Note will proceed in five parts. Part II will describe admiralty 
jurisdiction before the 2011 JVCA amendment. Part III will detail the 
JVCA amendment. Part IV will highlight the differing interpretations of 
the JVCA amendment. Part V will identify how courts should apply the 
JVCA amendment.    
                                                                                                                          
13 Romero, 358 U.S. at 371–72; FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11. 
14 Romero, 358 U.S. at 363, 370–73; FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11. 
15 See FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11 (“Romero does not preclude removal of a maritime 
case where there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity . . . .” (quoting  
Camacho v. Cove Trader, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1190, 1191  (E.D. Pa. 1985))); GILMORE & BLACK, JR., 
supra note 6, at 38 (citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 375) (“It has been decided by the Supreme Court that he 
may not sue in federal court, absent diversity, on the theory that a maritime claim ‘arises under’ the 
laws of the United States.”); Rory Bahadur, Maritime Removal: An Unlikely Heuristic for Anchoring 
Three Non-Textual Principles of Original Federal Jurisdiction, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 195, 208 (2012) 
(“The result of this pronouncement is that general maritime law claims may not be removed from state 
court unless there is an independent basis of jurisdiction present other than admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).     
16 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 
758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see David W. Robertson & Michael F. 
Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 401, 407 (2013) (noting that the law was signed in December 
2011 and took effect on January 6, 2012). 
17 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 407.  
18 See, e.g., id. (noting that the JVCA amendment appears to have “eased” the removability of 
general maritime actions); see also Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. 
Tex. 2013) (holding that the 2011 amendment to the removal statute now allows for the removal of 
general maritime claims).  
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II. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND REMOVAL PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL 
COURTS JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2011   
Federal jurisdiction over admiralty claims originates in the United 
States Constitution, which grants federal courts jurisdiction over “all Cases 
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”19 Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 
1789, conferred this constitutional grant of power onto the federal 
judiciary, which provided lower federal courts with both diversity and 
maritime jurisdiction.20 The saving to suitors clause was included in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 and qualified this grant of jurisdictional power by 
“saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where 
the common law is competent to give it.”21 Congress codified the admiralty 
jurisdiction grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1333,22 and while Congress has since 
changed the language of the saving to suitors clause, the substance of the 
clause has remained essentially unchanged since its enactment.23 In its 
current language, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides that federal district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of state courts of “[a]ny civil case 
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other 
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”24 Hence, federal courts are 
granted original jurisdiction over admiralty actions, with the exception of 
the saving to suitors clause, which saves to a plaintiff in admiralty actions 
any common law remedies available to him. However, in admiralty 
actions, the difference between in rem jurisdiction and in personam 
jurisdiction is critical to the correct application of jurisdictional power.      
That is because in admiralty the difference is determinative of certain 
rights and procedures in regard to the saving to suitors clause.25 The saving 
to suitors clause saves to a plaintiff the option of pursuing common law 
remedies in state court.26 Thus, it appears that there is a conflict within 28 
                                                                                                                          
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
20 See Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755–56 (E.D. La. 2014) 
(discussing the foundation of admiralty jurisdiction); Kenneth G. Engerrand, Admiralty Jury Trials 
Reconsidered, 12 LOY. MAR. L.J. 73, 74–75 (2013) (discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789 and 
admiralty jurisdiction); see also Ventura Packers, Inc. v. F/V Jeanine Kathleen, 305 F.3d 913, 918 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . conferred upon the federal district courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over all cases arising from seizures made on navigable waters . . . .”).  
21 Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 755.. 
22 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
23 Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443–44 (2001) (“In the intervening years, 
Congress has revised the language of the saving to suitors clause, but its substance has remained largely 
unchanged.”); Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (quoting Lewis, 531 U.S. at 444). .  
24 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  
25 Engerrand, supra note 20, at 85. 
26 Lewis, 531 U.S. at 454–55 (“Tracing the development of the [saving to suitors] clause since the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, it appears that the clause was designed to protect remedies available at common 
law. We later explained that the clause extends to ‘all means other than proceedings in admiralty which 
may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.’ Trial by jury is an obvious, but 
not exclusive, example of the remedies available to suitors.” (internal citations omitted)).                        
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U.S.C. § 1333, which provides original jurisdiction to federal courts, 
exclusive of state courts, in matters of admiralty jurisdiction.27 However, 
the conflict is illusory because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
only over in rem proceedings.28  
In Madruga v. Superior Court,29 the Supreme Court highlighted the 
difference between proceedings in rem and in personam.30 In Madruga, 
eight individuals who owned eighty-five percent of a vessel brought suit in 
California state court against the owner of the remaining fifteen percent of 
the vessel, seeking to have it sold and partitioned pursuant to a California 
statute.31 In distinguishing between in personam and in rem actions, the 
Court stated that “[a]dmiralty’s jurisdiction is ‘exclusive’ only as to those 
maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem, that 
is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the 
defendant by name or description to enforce a lien.”32 Further, the Court 
noted that state courts may adjudicate cases in personam, stating that “the 
jurisdictional act does leave state courts ‘competent’ to adjudicate 
maritime causes of action in proceedings ‘in personam,’ that is, where the 
defendant is a person, not a ship or some other instrument of navigation.”33 
The Court in Madruga held that the partition action was not an in rem 
action because the plaintiffs’ claims were against their co-owner and not 
the ship, which rendered California common law competent to provide the 
partition remedy.34 Federal courts retain exclusive original jurisdiction over 
admiralty in rem actions, but state courts—pursuant to the saving to suitors 
clause—may exercise jurisdiction over in personam proceedings.35 
Therefore, the saving to suitors clause provides plaintiffs three different 
alternatives:  
Since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, maritime 
suitors have had the option of bringing maritime claims 
                                                                                                                          
27 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 
28 Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 756; Engerrand, supra note 20, at 78.  
29 346 U.S. 556 (1954). 
30 Id. at 560; see Engerrand, supra note 20, at 83–84 (discussing Madruga and the distinction 
between in personam and in rem actions in admiralty jurisdiction).  
31 Madruga, 346 U.S. at 557. 
32 Id. at 560. 
33 Id. at 560–61. 
34 Id. at 561. 
35 See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 448, 452–55 (2001) (discussing the 
tension between the saving to suitors clause and Limitation Act proceedings, which have exclusive 
federal jurisdiction). The Court found an exception to the exclusive federal jurisdiction of Limitation 
Act proceedings, stating, “[i]n sum, this Court’s case law makes clear that state courts, with all their 
remedies, may adjudicate claims like petitioner’s against vessel owners so long as the vessel owner’s 
right to seek limitation of liability is protected.”. Id. at 455; see also Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.), 
Inc., No. 08-4007, 2014 WL 4794758, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2014) (discussing the implication of the 
limitation of liability actions and admiralty jurisdiction).  
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(seeking remedies the common law is competent to give) in 
federal court under admiralty jurisdiction, in state court, or in 
federal court under an independent ground of jurisdiction 
such as diversity of citizenship.36  
The concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts is important 
because depending on where the plaintiff initially files suit, different 
procedures and remedies are available to the plaintiff.37 
While the saving to suitors clause preserves the concurrent jurisdiction 
of federal and state courts and allows a plaintiff to bring suit in either 
forum, the substantive law that is applied in the different fora is the same 
because substantive maritime law is applied regardless of where the suit is 
initially filed.38 When discussing the law applicable in saving to suitors 
clause cases brought in state court, Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr. 
state that “[t]he general answer might seem clear: The same substantive 
law ought to be applied as would have been applied had the suit been 
brought in admiralty. Specifically, the general maritime law, where 
applicable, ought to rule, even though suit is brought in state court.”39 The 
United States Supreme Court in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger40 stated 
that “[t]he general rules of the maritime law apply whether the proceeding 
be instituted in an admiralty or common-law court.”41 Consequently, when 
a suit is brought in state court, the reverse-Erie doctrine applies.42 The 
reverse-Erie doctrine requires state substantive remedies to conform to 
                                                                                                                          
36 Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citation omitted).   
37 See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 446 (“Admiralty and maritime law includes a host of special rights, 
duties, rules, and procedures.”).  
38 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738–41 (1961); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 
259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922); In re Amtrack “Sunset Ltd.” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 1424–26 (11th Cir. 
1997); Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756–57 (E.D. La. 2014) (quoting 
Carlisle Packing Co., 259 U.S. at 259); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1182; see GILMORE & BLACK, JR., 
supra note 6, at 45–47 (discussing substantive maritime law and its components); W. Cameron Beard, 
III, Comment, General Agency Agreements and Admiralty Jurisdiction, 17 CONN. L. REV. 595, 627 
(1985) (“To do so undermines the uniform application of the rules governing the shipping industry and 
maritime commerce—the very purpose for which admiralty jurisdiction was originally vested in the 
federal courts.” (emphasis added)), cited in Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, 500 U.S. 603, 610 
(1991). But see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202 (1996) (“We hold, in 
accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that state remedies remain 
applicable in such cases and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death 
action . . . .”).    
39 GILMORE & BLACK, JR.,  supra note 6, at 50–51. 
40 Carlisle Packing Co., 259 U.S. at 259. 
41 Id. (citing Chelentis v. Lukenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 381 (1918)).      
42 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222–23 (1986) (“[T]he ‘saving to suitors’ 
clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, but in such cases the 
extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called 
‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to 
governing federal maritime standards.” (citations omitted)).  
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governing federal maritime standards.43 “Thus, where the subject-matter 
falls within the admiralty jurisdiction, state law may ‘supplement’ federal 
law but may not directly contradict it.”44 Whichever forum a plaintiff 
chooses, the substantive law that is applied is general maritime law, unless 
the plaintiff is pursuing his claim under a statutory basis.45 While the 
substantive law in the different fora may be the same, the procedures that 
are applied differ dramatically in certain circumstances.46 
A plaintiff’s decision of whether to bring his cause of action in federal 
court in admiralty or in state court has important ramifications for the 
procedures that are applied by the respective court. Admiralty law includes 
special rights, duties, and procedures, some of which are exclusive to 
admiralty, while other rights and procedures are available in suits at law.47 
One of the most important distinctions for a plaintiff in admiralty actions is 
that there is generally no right to a jury trial48 because the Seventh 
Amendment does not include admiralty actions.49 Thus, if a plaintiff wants 
to exercise his right to a jury trial, he must bring his case pursuant to the 
common law remedies that are saved to him by the saving to suitors 
clause.50 This is indicative of the importance of the saving to suitors clause. 
If a plaintiff wishes to have his cause of action heard by a jury, he must 
bring his claim pursuant to the saving to suitors clause because an action 
brought in admiralty will not afford him the right to a jury trial.51 
In the seminal case of Romero v. International Terminal Operating 
Co.,52 a decision written by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court 
recognized the importance of the saving to suitors clause in providing a 
                                                                                                                          
43 Id.  
44 Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 825 F. Supp. 424, 427 (D. Mass. 1993) (citations omitted). See 
GILMORE & BLACK, JR., supra note 6, at 49–50 (“All that can be said in general is that the states may 
not flatly contradict established maritime law, but may ‘supplement’ it . . . .”). 
45 See GILMORE & BLACK, JR., supra note 6, at 45–47 (discussing substantive maritime law, its 
components, and the influence of statutes on substantive maritime law). 
46 See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 446 (2001) (describing the different 
rights, remedies, and procedures available in admiralty law). 
47 See id. (“Admiralty and maritime law includes a host of special rights, duties, rules, and 
procedures.”); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (noting that 
admiralty law includes special rights and procedures). 
48 See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“While this Court has held that the 
Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any 
other provision of the Constitution forbids them.”); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183 (discussing how one 
of the major distinctions between admiralty claims and claims brought at law is the right to a jury trial). 
49 Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183.   
50 See Engerrand, supra note 20, at 78 (discussing the saving to suitors clause and the remedies 
saved to plaintiffs).  
51 See Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20 (“While this Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does 
not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the 
Constitution forbids them.”); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183 (discussing how one of the major 
distinctions between admiralty claims and claims brought at law is the right to a jury trial).  
52 358 U.S. 354 (1959).  
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plaintiff common law remedies.53 In Romero, the plaintiff was a Spanish 
sailor who was seriously injured by a cable while working on a Spanish-
flagged vessel in New York waters.54 Romero alleged various causes of 
action including a Jones Act claim55 and general maritime claims such as 
unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and a maritime tort.56 The plaintiff 
brought his causes of action on the law side of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Jones Act and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.57 The District 
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the Jones 
Act did not provide a right of action in the circumstances presented. 
Further, the court also dismissed the general maritime claims due to a lack 
of diversity of citizenship and because 28 U.S.C. § 1331 did not confer 
jurisdiction over claims of federal admiralty law.58 The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.59  
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case after an extensive 
analysis of the jurisdictional boundaries of admiralty law.60 The Court 
began its analysis with the origins of admiralty jurisdiction in the United 
States Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789,61 noting that the 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 were the initial grants of 
admiralty jurisdiction to the lower federal courts.62 The Court held that the 
Judiciary Act of 1875—which extended jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts to “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their authority”63—did not include admiralty 
cases because the language and construction of the statute rejected the 
                                                                                                                          
53 Id. at 371–73. 
54 Id. at 355–56. 
55 The Jones Act is referenced frequently throughout this Note and therefore a brief explanation is 
required. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001) (“A Jones Act claim is an 
in personam action for a seaman who suffers injury in the course of employment due to negligence of 
his employer, the vessel owner, or its crew members.”); Matthew Ammerman, The New Removal 
Regime, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 389, 397 (2014) (“Jones Act claims are nonremovable pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1445(a). However, a fraudulently pleaded Jones Act claim does not bar removal.”); but see 
infra notes 191–96 and accompanying text (discussing how Ammerman’s conclusion regarding the 
JVCA is erroneous). 
56 Romero, 358 U.S. at 356. 
57 Id. at 357; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (providing the statutory criteria for federal question 
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (providing the statutory criteria for diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction).    
58 Romero, 358 U.S. at 357–58. 
59 Id. at 358. 
60 Id. at 385.  
61 Id. at 360–61. 
62 Id. at 360. 
63 Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2015] STEERING A SAFE COURSE IN ADMIRALTY REMOVAL JURISDICTION 1163 
inclusion of admiralty into the Act.64  
Moreover, the Court noted that the inclusion of general maritime 
jurisdiction would be contrary to the construction of the Judiciary Act of 
1875, and that such an interpretation would have a negative impact on the 
traditional allocation of power of admiralty in the federal system, 
especially in regard to the saving to suitors clause.65 An expansion of 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 to include general maritime jurisdiction would annihilate the 
maritime plaintiff’s traditional option of choosing his forum, either state or 
federal, contrary to the saving to suitors clause.66 A maritime plaintiff’s  
option to choose his forum would be destroyed because his action would 
be freely removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which allows for the 
removal of any civil action over which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.67 
The Court, in part, rejected such an interpretation because “making 
maritime cases removable to the federal courts . . . would make 
considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction 
of the state courts in admiralty matters—a jurisdiction which it was the 
unquestioned aim of the savings clause of 1789 to preserve.”68 Thus, 
Romero stands for the proposition that admiralty cases are not considered 
federal questions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,69 and that the saving to 
suitors clause is an important part of admiralty jurisdiction that does not 
allow the removal of general maritime actions to federal court unless there 
is an independent basis for removal.70       
Therefore, the precedent of Romero v. International Terminal 
Operating Co., in addition to the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 
1333, prevents the removal of general maritime claims properly brought in 
state court. However, Congress, with the enactment of the Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, has created confusion as 
to whether general maritime claims are now removable pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1441.71   
 
                                                                                                                          
64 Id. at 368. 
65 Id. at 371–72.  
66 Id.   
67 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); Romero, 358 U.S. at 371–72. 
68 Romero, 358 U.S. at 372. 
69 Id. at 378. 
70 FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11. 
71 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 407 (stating that the JVCA amendment has made some 
“potentially troublesome changes” to the removal statute).  
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III.  THE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION                                                            
AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2011   
The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act (JVCA) 
was enacted in 2011.72 The JVCA changed pertinent language in the 
federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441.73 The change in language has 
led courts to misconstrue the recent amendment to the removal statute to 
allow the removal of general maritime claims to federal court.74 This 
interpretation is contrary to the precedent established by the Supreme 
Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. and to the saving 
to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.75 
There are generally four ways for a defendant to remove a lawsuit from 
state to federal court.76 This includes invoking a federal question, diversity 
of the parties, a statute that specifically permits removal, and alienage 
jurisdiction.77 Additionally, as federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction, removal statutes are construed in favor of remand and against 
removal.78 Thus, the holding of Romero v. International Terminal 
Operating Co. is that general maritime claims do not constitute a federal 
question and therefore there needs to be another independent basis for 
removal, such as diversity jurisdiction.79 Further, remand orders are 
generally not appealable, which may require a litigant to proceed in a 
forum that they did not choose if a judge issues a remand order that is not 
in their favor.80 Therefore, the interpretation of the JVCA amendment to 
                                                                                                                          
72 Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C. (2012)).   
73 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (providing the statutory criteria for removal prior to the 
JVCA), with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing the amended language of the removal statute 
following the enactment of the JVCA).  
74 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 407.  
75 See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (providing the saving to suitors clause); Romero v. Int’l Terminal 
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378–80 (1959) (noting that general maritime claims are not removable 
without an independent basis for removal).  
76 Ammerman, supra note 55, at 390–91. 
77 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (allowing for the removal of any civil action over which the 
federal district courts have original jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012) (allowing for the removal 
of  actions based on diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012) (providing for the removal of 
any action brought against the United States or United States agency and any officer of such agency); 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2012) (stating that federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions 
between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign State, thus allowing for removal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441).  
78 See Romero, 358 U.S. at 379–80 (discussing the reluctance of the Supreme Court to expand 
federal jurisdiction); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (stating that 
courts must strictly construe the removal statute against removal and that statutes extending federal 
jurisdiction are to be narrowly construed).   
79 Romero, 358 U.S. at 378–80; see FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11 (discussing Romero 
and the removability of admiralty actions).  
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012) (stating that remand orders are not appealable unless there is a 
statutory exception such as 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012)).    
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the removal statute is of critical importance to the removal of general 
maritime claims.    
Prior to the JVCA amendment in 2011, the relevant portion of 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 provided that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by 
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the 
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed.”81 The JVCA amendment did not change the relevant portion of 
subsection (a) of the removal statute.82 The controversy arises in the 
JVCA’s amendment to subsection (b) of the statute. Prior to 2011, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b) provided: 
Any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be 
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of 
the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if 
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 
brought.83 
The JVCA amendment to the removal statute in 2011 deleted key 
language from subsection (b). This subsection now provides that “[a] civil 
action otherwise removable solely on the basis of jurisdiction under section 
1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest 
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which 
such action is brought.”84  
While the JVCA was intended to clarify the law, the removal of the 
second sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) has caused confusion in the lower 
courts. Some courts have interpreted the amendment to the removal statute 
to allow the removal of general maritime claims to federal court.85 
However, this interpretation misconstrues the precedent established in 
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. and by the saving to 
suitors clause. Interpreting the JVCA amendment to the removal statute to 
allow the removal of general maritime claims would render the saving to 
suitors clause useless, by permitting a defendant to remove actions that 
                                                                                                                          
81 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). 
82 David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime 
Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 419, 477 (2014). 
83 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).   
84 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012). 
85 E.g., Ryan v. Hercules Offshore Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013); see 
Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1179 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (discussing different courts 
interpretations of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute); Ammerman, supra note 55, at 390–91 
(discussing the implications of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute and the differing 
interpretations).       
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were properly brought by a plaintiff pursuing common law remedies in 
state court. Therefore, as this interpretation is contrary to the precedent 
established in Romero—which precludes the removal of general maritime 
claims without an independent basis of federal jurisdiction aside from 28 
U.S.C. § 1333—and as it would make the saving to suitors clause 
irrelevant, this interpretation is erroneous.86 
IV.  CASES INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION AND 
VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2011 AND THE SAVING TO SUITORS 
CLAUSE    
The lower federal courts have interpreted the JVCA amendment to the 
removal statute in two primary ways. One interpretation of the JVCA 
amendment is that the jurisdictional boundaries of admiralty law have not 
been substantively changed and that the removal of general maritime 
claims is not permissible solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction.87 
This interpretation of the JVCA amendment is consistent with established 
precedent and the purpose of the saving to suitors clause.88 The other 
interpretation of the JVCA amendment is that the deletion of the pertinent 
language in the removal statute now permits the removal of general 
maritime claims.89 The leading case for the new interpretation of the 
removability of general maritime claims is Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, 
Inc.,90 and the court’s interpretation in that case will be referred to as the 
“Ryan interpretation” throughout the remainder of this Note. 
A.  A Number of Courts Have Interpreted the JVCA Amendment as 
Allowing the Removal of General Maritime Claims  
In Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., the estate of the decedent brought 
an action that asserted negligence and unseaworthiness claims pursuant to 
the Death on the High Seas Act and general maritime law.91 The decedent 
was working for the defendant, Wild Well Control, Inc., on a Jack-Up 
                                                                                                                          
86 Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378–80 (1959). 
87 See, e.g., Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. 
Nov. 7, 2014) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion to remand their general maritime claim from federal to 
state court as removal would deprive the plaintiff of the right to a jury trial saved by the saving to 
suitors clause; and rejecting the interpretation of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute to allow 
the removal of general maritime claims). 
88 See Romero, 358 U.S. at 378–80 (stating general maritime claims are not removable solely on 
the basis of admiralty jurisdiction and discussing the importance of the saving to suitors clause). 
89 See Ammerman, supra note 55, at 407 (discussing Ryan v. Hercules Offshore Inc., and how the 
court in that case interpreted the 2011 amendment to the removal statute); Robertson & Sturley, supra 
note 16, at 477 (discussing the 2011 amendment to the removal statute and how courts have interpreted 
the amendment).  
90 945 F. Supp. 2d 772 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
91 Id. at 773. 
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vessel drilling a deviated relief well.92 The decedent went into cardiac 
arrest and died.93 The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court, but the 
defendants removed the action to federal district court.94 In response, the 
plaintiff moved to remand, asserting that traditionally, general maritime 
claims have not been removable.95 The defendants’ claimed that, pursuant 
to the plain language of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute, 
general maritime claims were no longer precluded from removal.96 
The court in Ryan began its analysis by recognizing that historically, 
general maritime claims were precluded from removal.97 The court asserted 
that the bar on removal of general maritime claims was not due to the 
saving to suitors clause because that clause only saved to a plaintiff the 
right to pursue non-admiralty remedies and did not guarantee a non-federal 
forum, nor prevent the removal by a defendant on a basis of federal 
jurisdiction other than admiralty.98 Perhaps most significantly, the court 
asserted that the true preclusion of general maritime claims from removal 
was the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b),99 and that with the recent 
amendment to the removal statute, the language that had previously barred 
the removal of general maritime claims was deleted.100 The language that 
the court referenced was the second sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), 
which stated that “[a]ny other such action shall be removable only if none 
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a 
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”101 This language was 
not included in the 2011 JVCA amendment to the removal statute.102 The 
court reasoned that the language of the removal statute prior to the 2011 
JVCA amendment was an Act of Congress precluding removal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a),103 and that because this language was no longer included 
in the removal statute, there was no longer an “Act of Congress” that 
precluded the removal of general maritime claims.104 This reasoning was 
based on a decision of the Fifth Circuit from the early 1990s, In re 
Dutile.105 
                                                                                                                          
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 774. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d  at 777. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 775. 
102 Id. at 777.  
103 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). 
104 Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78. 
105 See In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that general maritime claims are 
precluded from removal unless there is complete diversity among the parties involved as general 
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In In re Dutile, the Fifth Circuit held that the preclusion of removal of 
general maritime claims was due to the language of the removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a), unless there was complete diversity of the parties 
involved.106 This was because maritime actions, whether in personam or in 
rem, do not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United 
States.107 Therefore, maritime actions fell into the “any other” category of 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), making them non-removable unless there was 
diversity among the parties.108 Thus, the court noted that 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b) was an Act of Congress that prevented the removal of 
maritime actions unless there was an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction, such as diversity jurisdiction.109 This analysis is critical to the 
court’s reasoning in Ryan, which relied on the fact that the language in 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b) was changed, removing the “any other” language that 
previously precluded removal of general maritime claims.110 Thus, the 
court in Ryan held that there was no longer an Act of Congress that 
precluded the removal of general maritime claims, and therefore, that 
general maritime claims were now removable.111 The holding by the court 
in Ryan has been cited by several other courts allowing the removal of 
general maritime claims.112 
For example, in Wells v. Abe’s Boat Rental Inc.,113 the court granted in 
part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to remand.114 The court 
granted the motion to remand in regard to the plaintiff’s Jones Act claims, 
but denied the motion to remand in regard to the plaintiff’s negligence 
claim under general maritime law.115 Citing the reasoning of the Ryan 
court, the Wells court held that general maritime claims are removable,116 
stating that “[e]ven assuming that general maritime law applies, under 
Ryan and the cases it cites this action is nonetheless removable, again with 
                                                                                                                          
maritime claims fall into the “any other” category of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)); see also Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 
2d at 775–76 (discussing the court’s reasoning in In re Dutile). 
106 In re Dutile, 935 F.2d at 63. 
107 Id. at 62–63; see Romero v. Int’l. Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 367 (1959) (holding 
that general maritime claims do not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States).    
108 In re Dutile, 935 F.2d at 63.  
109 Id.  
110 Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78. 
111 Id. 
112 See Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, slip op. at 6–7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 
2014) (applying the reasoning of the Ryan court to allow for the removal of general maritime claims); 
Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 4–5 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013) (citing Ryan 
and Wells v. Abe’s Boat Rentals Inc. as persuasive authority in allowing for the removal of general 
maritime claims); Wells v. Abe’s Boat Rentals Inc., No. H-13-112, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 
2013) (agreeing with and applying the reasoning of Ryan). 
113 Wells, No. H-13-112, slip op. at 1. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 2–3. 
116 Id. at 3–5. 
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the proviso that the Jones Act claim . . . is severed and remanded to the 
state court.”117 Thus, the court in Wells endorsed and relied upon the 
reasoning of the court in Ryan. 
Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador118 also cited the reasoning of Ryan 
in its decision to allow the removal of general maritime claims.119 In 
Carrigan, the plaintiff alleged claims under the Jones Act, as well as 
claims under general maritime law, including negligence and 
unseaworthiness.120 The court held that the plaintiff’s Jones Act claims 
were fraudulently pled, and therefore did not bar removal.121 Further, the 
court held “for the reasons well explained in Ryan, Plaintiff’s maritime 
claims are removable, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is denied.”122 
Thus, the court in Carrigan relied upon the reasoning applied by the court 
in Ryan to allow for the removal of general maritime claims.  
In Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co.,123 the court cited the reasoning in Ryan 
and Wells as persuasive authority in its holding that general maritime 
claims are removable.124 The plaintiff in Bridges asserted claims under 
Louisiana state law, general maritime law, and the Jones Act.125 The court 
acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit had historically not allowed the 
removal of general maritime claims saved to suitors, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(b).126 However, the court, citing Ryan and Wells, noted that the 
2011 JVCA amendment deleted the language of the removal statute which 
had previously been interpreted as an Act of Congress preventing removal 
of general maritime claims, and with the deletion of this language, removal 
was no longer precluded.127 Therefore, the court denied the plaintiff’s 
motion to remand.128    
The above-mentioned cases illustrate how the reasoning developed by 
the Ryan court has been applied to allow for the removal of general 
maritime claims. The reasoning of the court in Ryan can be summarized as 
follows:  
                                                                                                                          
117 Id. at 6. 
118 Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014). 
119 Id. at 6. 
120 Id. at 2. 
121 Id. at 6. 
122 Id.  
123 Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 1 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013). 
124 Id. at 4–5. 
125 Id. at 1. 
126 Id. at 2. 
127 Id. at 4; see Provost v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89, slip op. at 3–4 (M.D. La. June 
4, 2014) (applying the same reasoning as in Bridges and finding unpersuasive the argument that the 
saving to suitors clause prevents removal, as the plaintiff did not seek a jury trial that could not be 
pursued in a federal court sitting in admiralty); see also Garza v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-742, slip op. at 
4–5 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2014) (applying the reasoning of the Ryan and Wells courts to deny the 
plaintiff’s motion to remand). 
128 Bridges, No. 13-477, slip op. at 5. 
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(1) [F]ederal courts have original jurisdiction over admiralty 
claims; (2) the saving to suitors clause does not preclude 
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over admiralty 
claims originally brought in state court; (3) the old version of 
section 1441(b) was relied upon as the “Act of Congress” 
that precluded federal courts from exercising removal 
jurisdiction unless the requirements of section 1441(b) were 
met; and (4) admiralty cases do not arise under the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, so 
admiralty cases were considered “any other such actions” 
under the prior version of section 1441(b) and were thus 
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly 
joined and served as defendants was a citizen of the State in 
which the action was brought.129 
Ryan represents one interpretation of the JVCA, and is arguably the 
minority view of how to interpret the recent amendment.130 One aspect that 
is not discussed in depth in the aforementioned cases is the effect that the 
Ryan interpretation of the JVCA has on the saving to suitors clause. In 
contrast to Ryan, other courts have held that the recent JVCA amendment 
has had no effect on the ability to remove general maritime claims to 
federal court.131     
B.  The JVCA Should be Interpreted as Having No Effect on the Ability of 
General Maritime Claims to be Removed to Federal Court  
The JVCA should not be interpreted to allow the removal of general 
maritime claims, as such an interpretation would eviscerate the saving to 
suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.132 The other main interpretation of the 
JVCA holds that the JVCA amendment has no substantial effect on the 
removability of general maritime claims. Thus, courts should follow the 
precedent of decisions such as Gregoire v. Enterprise Marine Services, 
LLC,133 which have interpreted the JVCA as not affecting jurisprudence to 
allow for the removal of general maritime claims.134 
                                                                                                                          
129 Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
130 Id.; see Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. Nov. 
7, 2014) (“The Court believes that the correct view is also the majority view and that general maritime 
claims are not removable, despite the changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.”).    
131 Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78; but see Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 
3d 749, 754 (E.D. La. 2014) (holding that Ryan is an erroneous interpretation of the JVCA and that the 
JVCA has no substantial effect on the removability of general maritime claims); Cassidy v. Murray, 34 
F. Supp. 3d 579, 583 (D. Md. 2014) (rejecting the reasoning in Ryan); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. 
Supp. 3d 1175, 1179–80 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (rejecting the reasoning in Ryan).  
132 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).  
133 38 F. Supp. 3d 749 (E.D. La. 2014). 
134 Id. at 754. 
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In Gregoire, the court rejected the interpretation of the JVCA of the 
court in Ryan v. Hercules and held that the JVCA did not allow for the 
removal of general maritime claims.135 The plaintiff in Gregoire invoked 
the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333, alleging a Jones Act claim 
and general maritime claims in Louisiana state court for injuries sustained 
while working for the defendant.136 The defendant timely removed from 
state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.137 The plaintiff filed a motion to 
remand asserting that general maritime claims are not removable, without 
an independent basis because they are not within the original jurisdiction 
of the federal court when brought pursuant to the saving to suitors clause 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.138 The defendant, in opposition to the motion, 
asserted that due to the 2011 JVCA amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) no 
longer precluded the removal of general maritime claims, and that general 
maritime claims were now normally removable.139  
The court stated that “[t]he issue in this case hinges upon the operation 
of the ‘saving to suitors clause,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1333, with respect to removal 
of maritime and admiralty claims under the removal statute.”140 The court 
explicitly declined to follow the interpretation of the JVCA by the court in 
Ryan v. Hercules;141 instead, the court in Gregoire concluded that “‘the 
statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and more than 
200 years of precedent interpreting this grant’ rather than the 2011 
amendment to the removal statute . . . determine the removability of 
Gregoire’s claims.”142 Thus, the court noted that general maritime claims 
have historically never been removable and are not currently removable, 
unless there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction aside from 28 
U.S.C. § 1333.143 
The court based its reasoning on the history of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and 
how § 1333 provides exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts of in rem 
actions, but provides concurrent jurisdiction to state courts of in personam 
actions.144 This superficially appears to place maritime actions within the 
original jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), thus allowing the removal of 
such claims.145 However, the Gregoire court stated that Congress had 
carefully written 28 U.S.C. § 1333 to balance the interests of federalism, 
                                                                                                                          
135 Id.; Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78. 
136 Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 752. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 753. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 754. 
142 Id. (quoting Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014)). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 764.  
145 Id.  
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and that the inclusion of the saving to suitors clause was in recognition of 
the historical development of maritime actions in state courts.146 The court 
noted that “[m]aritime claims initiated in state court are, by definition, 
brought at common law under the saving to suitors clause as an ‘exception’ 
to the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.”147 Thus, the change in 
language of the 2011 JVCA amendment “in no way modified the long-
standing rule that general maritime law claims require some other non-
admiralty source of jurisdiction to be removable.”148    
The court in Coronel v. AK Victory149 also rejected the interpretation of 
the JVCA amendment allowing removal of general maritime claims.150 The 
plaintiff in Coronel asserted claims of maintenance, cure, and lost wages 
under the general maritime law, as well as a Jones Act claim in 
Washington state court.151 The defendant removed the claim to federal 
district court, and the plaintiff filed a motion to remand.152 The parties in 
the action focused their arguments on the language of the removal statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1441, but the court focused its analysis on the “statutory grant 
of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and the more than 200 years of 
precedent interpreting this grant to determine the removability of 
the . . . claims.”153  
The court began by analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which provides 
exclusive jurisdiction of in rem admiralty actions to federal courts, and the 
saving to suitors clause, which preserves the concurrent jurisdiction of 
state courts over in personam admiralty actions.154 The court, citing to a 
Ninth Circuit decision, noted that the saving to suitors clause provides 
litigants with three options for a plaintiff alleging admiralty claims. “‘He 
may file suit in federal court under the federal court’s admiralty 
jurisdiction, in federal court under diversity jurisdiction if the parties are 
diverse and the amount in controversy is satisfied, or in state court.’”155 
The court described how historically, saving to suitors clause claims could 
not be removed from state court absent another basis for federal 
jurisdiction, such as diversity jurisdiction or another maritime statute such 
as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.156 Another basis for jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                          
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
150 Id. at 1180. 
151 Id. at 1177. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 1178. 
154 Id. at 1181. 
155 Id. at 1186 (quoting Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 115 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 
1997)). 
156 Id.; see 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he district courts of the United States shall have 
jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with (A) any operation 
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is necessary, as 28 U.S.C. § 1333 does not provide subject matter 
jurisdiction to federal courts for maritime claims brought at law without an 
independent basis, and allowing removal of general maritime claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) without an independent jurisdictional basis 
would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause.157 Thus, the court held that 
general maritime claims were not removable without an independent basis, 
due to federalism concerns and the balance of power between federal and 
state courts, in addition to the saving to suitors clause, and the established 
precedent of not allowing the removal of general maritime claims without 
an independent basis.158   
In Cassidy v. Murray,159 the court rejected the Ryan v. Hercules court’s 
interpretation of the 2011 JVCA amendment.160 In Cassidy, the plaintiffs 
alleged claims of negligence against the defendant, and initially brought 
suit in Maryland state court.161 The defendant removed the action, and the 
plaintiffs filed a motion to remand.162 The court in Cassidy focused its 
reasoning on the saving to suitors clause, and the effect the Ryan 
interpretation would have on 28 U.S.C. § 1333.163 In rejecting the Ryan 
interpretation of the JVCA, the court stated:  
First, the removal of admiralty cases without an independent 
jurisdictional basis permits the very occurrence the Supreme 
Court attempted to avoid in Romero—the evisceration of the 
savings clause. The purpose of the clause is to preserve the 
traditional role of the states in the administration of the 
common-law remedies for maritime cases. Permitting 
defendants to remove these cases without an independent 
jurisdictional basis not only disrupts decades of maritime 
precedent but also renders the saving clause null and void.164    
Further, the court noted that the saving to suitors clause illustrates the 
importance of preserving the plaintiff’s choice of which forum to bring his 
cause of action.165 The court was not willing to reject decades of 
jurisprudence to adopt an attempt to change removal procedures without 
                                                                                                                          
conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, ….”); Barker v. 
Hercules Offshore Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 220 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act and original federal jurisdiction).     
157 Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1184–85. 
158 Id. at 1187–88. 
159 34 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. Md. 2014). 
160 Id. at 581; see Ryan v. Hercules Offshore Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2013) 
(holding that general maritime claims are now removable under the JVCA).   
161 Cassidy, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 580.  
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 581.  
164 Id. at 583 (citations omitted).  
165 Id. at 584.  
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clear precedential authority.166 Thus, Cassidy v. Murray demonstrates a 
rejection of the Ryan court’s interpretation of the JVCA with special 
emphasis placed on the adverse consequences to the saving to suitors 
clause.   
In Harrold v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters,167 a United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana decision, the plaintiff’s 
right to a jury trial was a consideration in the court’s rejection of the Ryan 
interpretation of the JVCA.168 The plaintiff in Harrold asserted general 
maritime claims for negligence and a Jones Act claim.169 These claims 
were brought in state court with a request for a jury trial.170 The defendant 
removed the action and the plaintiff sought to have the action remanded to 
state court.171 The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand for three 
reasons.172 The first reason was that the plaintiff had specifically requested 
a trial by jury, and allowing the defendant to remove the action would 
deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial.173 The court noted how the saving to 
suitors clause prevents such outcomes, and ordered that the action must be 
remanded.174 The court’s second rationale was in regard to the Jones Act 
claim, but the third reason for granting the plaintiff’s motion to remand 
was a rejection of the Ryan court’s interpretation of the JVCA.175 The court 
stated that “the correct view is also the majority view and that general 
maritime claims are not removable, despite the changes to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441.”176 
In Yavorsky v. Felice Navigation, Inc.,177 the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana rejected the reasoning of the 
Ryan interpretation of the 2011 JVCA amendment, and applied the 
reasoning that the court in Gregoire established.178 Thus, the court held 
that the 2011 amendment to the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, did not 
change the precedent that general maritime claims initially brought in state 
court are not removable absent an independent basis for jurisdiction in 
federal court.179    
The aforementioned cases illustrate the correct interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                          
166 Id. 
167 Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 1 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014). 
168 Id. at 2. 
169 Id. at 1. 
170 Id.  
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 2.  
173 Id. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 2–3. 
176 Id. at 3. 
177 Yavorsky v. Felice Navigation, Inc., No. 14-2007, slip op. at 1 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014). 
178 Id. at 4–5. 
179 Id. at 5. 
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2011 JVCA amendment. In addition to the cases detailed, a multitude of 
other courts have also interpreted the JVCA amendment as not changing 
the removability of general maritime claims.180 Courts should continue to 
interpret the JVCA amendment as not changing the removal jurisdiction of 
general maritime claims to federal courts. 
V.  THE 2011 JVCA AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT BE                             
INTERPRETED AS HAVING AN EFFECT ON THE                                                                      
REMOVABILITY OF GENERAL MARITIME CLAIMS  
Courts should not interpret the JVCA amendment to allow for the 
removal of general maritime claims, contrary to the reasoning in Ryan v. 
Hercules,181 as doing so would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause. 
Instead, courts should follow the precedent of cases such as Gregoire v. 
Enterprise Marine Services, LLC, and Coronel v. AK Victory in 
interpreting the JVCA amendment to have no material effect on the 
removability of general maritime claims.182 Interpreting the JVCA 
amendment in a manner similar to Gregoire and Coronel recognizes the 
importance of the saving to suitors clause, and preserves the jurisdictional 
balance between federal and state courts, which the saving to suitors clause 
seeks to protect. Following the interpretation of the JVCA amendment, as 
interpreted by the courts in Gregoire and Coronel, would also be consistent 
with the seminal decision of Romero v. International Terminal Operating 
Co., and the concerns the Court in Romero had with protecting the saving 
to suitors clause from being undermined.183 Thus, courts should interpret 
the 2011 JVCA amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 as having no significant 
effect on the ability of general maritime claims to be removed to federal 
court.  
Courts have noted that there is a precedential history of more than two-
hundred years that does not allow for the removal of general maritime 
                                                                                                                          
180 See Bartman v. Burrece, No. 3:14-CV-0080-RRB, 2014 WL 4096226, at *3 (D. Alaska Aug. 
18, 2014) (“Notwithstanding recent amendments to the statute governing removal, the reservation of 
remedies at common law preserved in the statute granting the Court’s original jurisdiction support 
remand of this matter back to state court.”); Figueroa v. Marine Inspection Servs., LLC, 28 F. Supp. 3d 
677, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“This Court disagrees with the holding in Ryan.”); Gabriles v. Chevron 
USA, Inc., No. 2:14-00669, slip op. at 4 (W.D. La. June 6, 2014) (“The Court disagrees that the 2011 
amendment altered the long-held understanding that admiralty claims brought at law in state court 
pursuant to the saving to suitors clause are not removable in the absence of an independent 
jurisdictional basis.” (footnote omitted)).  
181 Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
182 Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754 (E.D. La. 2014); Coronel v. 
AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
183 See Romero v. Int’l. Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371–72 (1959) (discussing the 
importance of the saving to suitors clause and how the choice of a maritime plaintiff to bring suit in 
either state or federal court needs to be protected). 
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claims without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.184 Therefore, 
the Ryan interpretation of the 2011 JVCA amendment reverses over two-
hundred years of precedent by allowing the removal of general maritime 
claims without an independent basis.185 The Ryan decision is a drastic 
departure from established precedent and has caused confusion among 
courts in how to interpret the JVCA amendment.186 Such a dramatic 
departure from precedent should not be undertaken on the basis of the 
deletion of one sentence from the federal removal statute, which is 
essentially the rationale behind the court’s decision in Ryan.187 The 
rationale used by the court in Ryan also fails to place sufficient weight 
upon the saving to suitors clause, and the effect that interpreting the JVCA 
amendment to allow removal of general maritime claims would have upon 
the saving to suitors clause and plaintiffs seeking to bring their causes of 
action in state court.188 
The Ryan interpretation of the JVCA amendment would essentially 
abrogate the saving to suitors clause by allowing a defendant to freely 
remove general maritime claims brought by a plaintiff in state court 
seeking common law remedies. The saving to suitors clause is an important 
qualifier to the grant of original jurisdiction to the lower federal courts 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333189 and acts as an exception to the original 
jurisdiction of federal courts over admiralty actions.190 Thus, significantly, 
the saving to suitors clause preserves the concurrent jurisdiction of state 
                                                                                                                          
184 See Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (quoting Coronel in regard to the history of the removal of 
general maritime claims); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1178 (discussing the precedential history of 
removal jurisdiction); see also Romero, 358 U.S. 354 at 363 n.16 (“The removal provisions of the 
original Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, conferred a limited removal jurisdiction, not including cases 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In none of the statutes enacted since that time have saving-
clause cases been made removable.”).   
185 See Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78 (discussing deletions to the statute that required cases to 
meet certain requirements for removal and the substantive congressional intent of those changes). 
186 See, e.g., Cassidy v. Murray, 34 F. Supp. 3d 579, 583 (D. Md. 2014) (rejecting the reasoning in 
Ryan); Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 4–5 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013) 
(citing Ryan as persuasive authority for allowing the removal of general maritime claims). 
187 See Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78 (holding that there is no longer an Act of Congress that 
precludes the removal of general maritime claims due to the JVCA amendment deleting language in 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b)). 
188 Id. (discussing the saving to suitors clause, but not the effect that allowing the removal of 
general maritime claims would have upon the saving to suitors clause). 
189 See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012) (providing the jurisdictional basis for federal admiralty 
jurisdiction including the saving to suitors clause). 
190 See Barker v. Hercules Offshore Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A]dmiralty 
jurisdiction is not present in this suit because Barker filed in state court, therefore invoking the saving-
to-suitors exception to original jurisdiction.”); Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 
749, 764 (E.D. La. 2014) (discussing the saving to suitors clause and how it operates as an exception to 
the original jurisdiction of federal courts when a claim is brought in state court). 
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courts over certain admiralty actions,191 as exclusive original jurisdiction of 
the federal courts is limited to in rem actions, while in personam actions, 
pursuant to the saving to suitors clause, may be brought in either state or 
federal court.192 The interpretation of the JVCA by the court in Ryan 
destroys these federalism ideals that the saving to suitors clause is intended 
to protect.193 
The court’s interpretation of the JVCA in Ryan annihilates the 
federalism principles that the saving to suitors clause intends to protect by 
allowing the removal of general maritime claims. This interpretation 
destroys the ability of a plaintiff to bring a general maritime action in state 
court because, once the action is initially filed in state court, the defendant 
could simply remove the action and the plaintiff would be forced to litigate 
in federal court, which functionally shifts the selection of the forum to the 
defendant. Thus, the concurrent jurisdiction preserved by the saving to 
suitors clause is eliminated and the federal court would, in practice, have 
exclusive original jurisdiction of not only in rem actions, but in personam 
actions as well. Providing federal courts with exclusive original 
jurisdiction over both in rem and in personam proceedings would be a 
significant break with established precedent that should not be considered 
lightly and is contrary to the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction in 28 
U.S.C. § 1333.194 
Interpreting the JVCA amendment to allow for the removal of general 
maritime claims brought in state court would also have important 
ramifications for the remedies that a plaintiff would be able to seek. The 
saving to suitors clause saves to a plaintiff common law remedies—most 
notably the ability to request a trial by jury.195 When a suit is brought in 
admiralty, a jury trial is generally not an available remedy, as the Seventh 
                                                                                                                          
191 See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372 (1959) (“By making maritime 
cases removable to the federal courts it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally 
exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters—a jurisdiction which it was 
the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to preserve.”). 
192 Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560–61 (1954) (discussing the difference between 
in rem and in personam jurisdiction and over which proceedings federal courts have exclusive original 
jurisdiction). 
193 See Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (allowing 
for the removal of general maritime claims, which the saving to suitors clause intends to prevent by 
providing state courts concurrent jurisdiction).  
194 See Romero, 358 U.S. at 372 (discussing the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts 
that the saving to suitors clause preserves); Madruga, 346 U.S. at 560–61 (stating that federal courts 
only have exclusive original jurisdiction of in rem proceedings). 
195 Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Perhaps the most 
salient distinction persisting between maritime claims brought in admiralty and at law is the right to a 
jury trial.”); see also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“While this Court has held 
that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither the Amendment nor 
any other provision of the Constitution forbids them.”).  
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Amendment does not include admiralty actions.196 Accordingly, when a 
plaintiff seeks a trial by jury, the saving to suitors clause allows the 
plaintiff the option of pursuing his claim in state court. If the JVCA 
amendment were to be interpreted to freely allow the removal of general 
maritime claims, the ability of a plaintiff to seek a trial by jury would be 
severely impeded. This interpretation would allow a defendant to remove a 
plaintiff’s action from state court, where the plaintiff could seek a trial by 
jury, to federal court, where the plaintiff would lose his right to seek a jury 
trial. This possibility is illustrated in the case of Harrold v. Liberty 
Insurance Underwriters Inc., in which the plaintiff sought a jury trial 
pursuant to the saving to suitors clause in state court and the defendant 
removed the action to federal court.197 The court noted that the plaintiff 
would be denied his request to seek a trial by jury if the action was allowed 
to proceed in federal court, and that the saving to suitors clause prohibited 
such an outcome.198 Harrold acts as a stark warning of the potential 
negative consequences that an interpretation of the JVCA allowing the 
removal of general maritime claims may have in depriving a plaintiff of the 
ability to seek a jury trial.   
Further, a court that had previously agreed with the Ryan interpretation 
of the JVCA has called into question Ryan’s reasoning when applied to 
parties seeking jury trials.199 In Perise v. Eni Petroleum, U.S. L.L.C.,200 the 
court held that federal question jurisdiction was proper pursuant to a 
statutory basis aside from 28 U.S.C. § 1333.201 However, the court 
discussed the recent JVCA amendment and its effect on removal of general 
maritime claims.202 The magistrate judge noted that the district judge in the 
case agreed with the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA allowing for the 
removal of general maritime claims but had not considered the implication 
of the saving to suitors clause in barring the removal of general maritime 
claims.203 The court stated “[i]f [the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act] 
was not a basis for this court’s jurisdiction, then Plaintiff’s maritime claims 
may warrant remand under the ‘savings to suitors’ clause because of his 
jury demand.”204 This is noteworthy as it appears to be a retreat by a court 
that had previously held the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA to be correct 
                                                                                                                          
196 Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183. 
197 Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, No. 13-762, slip op. at 1–2 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014). 
198 Id. at 2. 
199 See Perise v. Eni Petroleum, U.S. L.L.C., No. 14-99-SDD-RLB, slip op. at 5 (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 
2014) (stating that even though a district judge had previously agreed with the Ryan interpretation of 
the JVCA, this interpretation may be incorrect when a plaintiff requests a jury trial).  
200 Id. at 1. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 5.  
203 Id. 
204 Id.  
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and calls into question the viability of the removal of general maritime 
claims when a jury trial is sought by the plaintiff.205 The court explicitly 
stated that it had not previously considered the consequence of the saving 
to suitors clause when agreeing with the Ryan interpretation of the 
JVCA.206 Thus, when considering the damaging effect that the Ryan 
interpretation of the JVCA could have by denying a plaintiff the ability to 
seek a jury trial, under the saving to suitors clause, courts should reject the 
Ryan interpretation, and heed the concerns raised by the court in Perise.207   
The court in Ryan v. Hercules relied extensively on the removal of key 
language in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), holding that this language was an Act of 
Congress that prohibited removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and 
with the JVCA’s change in language in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), there was no 
longer an Act of Congress barring removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).208 
However, this reasoning is flawed, as there is still an Act of Congress that 
bars the removal of general maritime claims.209 That Act of Congress is 28 
U.S.C. § 1333, which includes the saving to suitors clause, allowing a 
plaintiff the ability to bring his claims in state court, and barring the 
removal of such claims unless there is an independent basis for removal.210 
Pursuant to the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “[e]xcept as 
otherwise expressly provided by [an] Act of Congress, any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”211 The JVCA changed 
the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, but the saving to suitors clause of 28 
U.S.C. § 1333 has not been changed, and is still an Act of Congress which 
allows a plaintiff to bring general maritime claims in state court, unless 
there is an independent basis for removal.212 Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 is an 
Act of Congress that bars removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
Applying the reasoning of the Ryan court, the saving to suitors clause is an 
                                                                                                                          
205 Id. 
206 Id.  
207 Id.; see Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013) 
(holding that general maritime claims are removable under the JVCA amendment). 
208 Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777; see In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
general maritime claims are not removable due to the language of the federal removal statute).   
209 See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 408 (“[I]t is black-letter law that the saving to 
suitors clause is an ‘express[]’ provision of Congress against the removability of state-court maritime 
cases.” (internal citations omitted)); but see Ammerman, supra note 55, at 414 (“It is likely that federal 
appellate courts and perhaps eventually the Supreme Court will take up the issue of whether general 
maritime law claims are removable as the plain language of § 1441(a) now indicates—despite the 
saving-to-suitors exception . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
210 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
211 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012). 
212 28 U.S.C. § 1333; Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 
(“[T]hroughout the history of federal admiralty jurisdiction—from the Judiciary Act of 1789 through 
Romero and up to the present—courts have given no indication that maritime claims are cognizable on 
the law side of the federal courts absent subject matter jurisdiction independent of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.”).  
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Act of Congress that should prevent the removal of general maritime 
claims.213  
It is interesting to note the location of the courts that agree with the 
Ryan interpretation of the JVCA as compared to the location of courts that 
reject the Ryan interpretation. District courts in the Fifth Circuit are 
currently split as to which interpretation of the JVCA is correct.214 The 
Southern District of Texas continues to apply the reasoning of Ryan.215 
Another state in the Fifth Circuit, Louisiana, is split as to whether the Ryan 
interpretation of the JVCA is correct.216 In Gregoire, the Eastern District of 
Louisiana held that the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA was erroneous and 
that the JVCA did not have a substantial effect on the removability of 
general maritime claims.217 However, the Western and Middle Districts of 
Louisiana are split as to whether the Ryan or the Gregoire interpretation of 
the JVCA is correct.218 
The rejection of the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA amendment is not 
limited to courts in the Fifth Circuit. District courts in two other circuits, 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, have also rejected the Ryan interpretation of 
the JVCA.219 In Cassidy v. Murray,220 the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland explicitly rejected the Ryan interpretation of the 
JVCA.221 Additionally, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington has rejected the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA 
amendment.222 These cases demonstrate that Ryan represents the minority 
                                                                                                                          
213 28 U.S.C. § 1333; 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012); see Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777 (stating that as 
there is no longer an Act of Congress precluding removal of general maritime claims, thus general 
maritime claims are now removable).   
214 See Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78 (holding that general maritime claims are now removable 
under the JVCA). But see Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754 (E.D. La. 
2014) (holding that the JVCA did not change the removability of general maritime claims). 
215 See Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 
2014) (citing the reasoning in Ryan to allow for the removal of general maritime claims); Ryan, 945 F. 
Supp. 2d at 777–78 (allowing for the removability of general maritime claims); Wells v. Abe’s Boat 
Rentals Inc., No. H-13-1112, slip op. at 3–4 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2013) (agreeing with and applying 
Ryan’s reasoning). 
216 See Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (stating that the JVCA did not change the removability of 
general maritime claims). But see Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 4 (M.D. 
La. Nov. 19, 2013) (citing Ryan and Wells as persuasive authority in allowing for the removal of 
general maritime claims).  
217 Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754.  
218 See Provost v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89-SDD-SCR, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. June 
4, 2014) (allowing for the removal of general maritime claims under the JVCA amendment to the 
removal statute); but see Gabriles v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 2:14-00669, slip op. at 4 (W.D. La. June 
6, 2014) (disagreeing that the JVCA amendment allows for the removal of general maritime claims).  
219 Cassidy v. Murray, 34 F. Supp. 3d 579, 583 (D. Md. 2014); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 
3d 1175, 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2014).  
220 Cassidy, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 580. 
221 Id. at 583.  
222 Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1180. 
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view of the JVCA interpretation and should not be adopted in other 
circuits.223    
In addition, the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA does not follow the 
principles established for determining when removal is appropriate. 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the federal removal 
statute is to be strictly construed against removal.224 Further, federal 
jurisdiction “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 
removal in the first instance.”225 Removal is to be strictly construed due in 
part to federalism concerns because the removing court deprives a state 
court from properly hearing an action.226 The court in Ryan did not follow 
these principles because it did not apply the well established precedent that 
the removal of general maritime claims is not allowed without an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.227 In Ryan, the court did not 
reject the removal of the action even though there was a doubt that removal 
was improper. In its interpretation of the JVCA, the Ryan court did not 
strictly construe the removal statute, but interpreted the statute in a manner 
that enlarged federal removal jurisdiction on an unprecedented scale. 
Therefore, as the Ryan court interpreted the JVCA in a manner that is 
inconsistent with established removal principles, the interpretation is 
erroneous. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The recent amendment to the federal removal statute has caused 
uncertainty in regard to the removability of general maritime claims 
without an independent jurisdictional basis aside from 28 U.S.C. § 1333.228 
However, when one considers the more than two-hundred years of 
precedent prohibiting the removal of general maritime claims without an 
independent basis for jurisdiction and the effect an interpretation allowing 
removal would have on the saving to suitors clause, it becomes readily 
apparent that there is only one correct interpretation of the JVCA 
amendment. The correct interpretation is that there has been no substantial 
change in the removability of general maritime claims and that a general 
                                                                                                                          
223 See Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 
2014) (stating that the Ryan interpretation is the minority view for interpreting the JVCA).  
224 See Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1178 (discussing the principles that courts apply to determine 
whether removal is appropriate).   
225 Id. (citations omitted). 
226 See Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 753 (E.D. La. 2014) 
(“Additionally, because removal jurisdiction implicates important federalism concerns, the federal 
removal statute is subject to strict construction.”).   
227 Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (allowing for 
the removal of general maritime claims). 
228 Id. But see Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (holding that general maritime claims are not 
removable and that the JVCA did not substantially change removal jurisdiction). 
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maritime claim can be removed only when there is an independent basis 
for federal jurisdiction.229 This interpretation is consistent with precedent 
and also protects the saving to suitors clause from being eviscerated. Thus, 
as courts continue to chart their way through removal jurisdiction, they 
should interpret the JVCA as having no substantial effect on the 
removability of general maritime claims.230 
                                                                                                                          
229 See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372–75 (1959) (discussing how 
general maritime claims cannot be removed without an independent basis aside from 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333); Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (requiring an independent basis for the removal of general 
maritime claims). 
230 Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (“In short, general maritime law claims are not now 
removable—nor have they ever been—without an independent basis of jurisdiction other than 28 
U.S.C. § 1333 . . . .”). 
